We use a quasi-experimental research design to examine the effect of model-based capital regulation on the pro-cyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, capital charges for loans under model-based regulation increased by 0.5 percentage points. As a consequence, banks reduced the amount of these loans by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more than for loans under the traditional approach with fixed capital charges. We find an even stronger effect when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that micro-prudential capital regulation can have sizeable real effects.
This institutional setup allows us to control for heterogeneous effects of the credit risk shock on individual firms' loan demand or on individual banks' loan supply. We do this in the following way:
(1) firm fixed effects control for any demand shocks; our estimates compare the change in IRB loans to the change in SA loans to a given borrower (compare with Khwaja and Mian (2008) ); (2) our main specification includes bank fixed effects which control for bank-specific supply shocks, and relies only on within-bank variation in the adjustment of IRB and SA loans (compare with Jiménez et al. (2014a) ). We investigate whether, within firms that have multiple lending relationships with IRB banks, loans that use the IRB approach are adjusted differently to loans that remain under SA.
We find that increases in capital charges caused by pro-cyclical regulation have a strong and economically meaningful impact on the adjustment of loans over the credit risk shock. In our sample, capital requirements for loans under IRB rose by about 0.5 percentage points as banks adjusted their internal risk estimates (considering that the regulatory minimum capital requirement is 8 % of risk-weighted assets, RWA, this is a large change). In contrast, capital charges for loans subject to SA remained constant. Our estimates indicate that, as a consequence, IRB banks reduced loans to the same firm by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more in response to the shock, when capital charges for the loan were based on internal ratings (IRB) instead of fixed risk weights (SA).
We further examine whether the increases in capital requirements associated with the credit risk shock affect the aggregate availability of bank credit to firms. Interestingly, we find that pro-cyclical effects are even stronger at the firm level. A firm with 82 % of its loans subject to IRB prior to the shock (the 75 th percentile) experiences a reduction in aggregate borrowing from banks that is 3.0 to 4.6 percentage points larger than the reduction for a firm with 43 % of its loans subject to IRB (the 25 th percentile). 3 There are two reasons for this large effect on the overall availability of bank loans: (1) banks made relatively larger reductions to large IRB exposures in response to the credit risk shock and (2) during economic downturns, it is difficult for firms to offset reductions in lending from one bank by increasing borrowing from other banks. Furthermore, we find little evidence that firms that had more IRB loans experienced greater increases in borrowing costs, which suggests that banks adjusted loan quantities rather than loan conditions (e.g., interest rates) in reaction to the credit risk shock.
Our results could be affected by selection effects, if there are systematic differences between IRB and SA loans that also affect the adjustment of loans in response to the shock. Importantly, banks adopting IRB irrevocably switched whole loan portfolios, not specific loans, and the order in which portfolios were switched was determined in 2006, well before the credit risk shock. Whether a specific loan portfolio had been switched to IRB prior to the shock was mainly determined by the size of the portfolio. Banks first applied IRB to large loan portfolios for which they had sufficient data to calibrate a meaningful risk model. We find that the size of a portfolio has a positive influence on the adjustment of loans over the shock, which means that any bias from selection is likely to work against our findings.
To mitigate remaining concerns regarding differences between IRB and SA loans, we exploit another institutional feature of the Basel II framework and develop an additional test that relies solely on variation within the pool of loans subject to IRB. The regulation provides a capital charge discount for loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with a turnover of less than e 50 million, so the impact of the credit risk shock on capital charges for IRB loans varies with the size of the firm. We find that the relative reduction of IRB loans is 1.3 to 3.2 percentage points stronger for firms with a turnover of e 50 million, as compared with firms with a turnover of e 25 million.
Importantly, this test is based on variation in the adjustment of capital charges over the credit risk shock within the IRB portfolio of a specific bank, so any systematic differences between the bank's IRB and SA loans are immaterial. The adjustment of loans seen in this test depends on the size of the increase in capital charges and cannot be due to the assignment of loans to the IRB group.
Several cross-sectional tests further strengthen our results. Increases in capital requirements are more problematic for less capitalized banks, which consequently adjust their IRB loans more, in response to the credit risk shock. This illustrates that our findings would likely be less pronounced if banks kept larger buffers over the regulatory minimum. Furthermore, the IRB effect is more pronounced for less profitable firms, which are likely to be more affected by the credit risk shock, and for firms to which IRB banks have a relatively large exposure.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between bank capital regulation and lending. While previous papers in this field study the impact of changes in capital requirements imposed by the regulator (e.g., Peek and Rosengren (1995) , Thakor (1996) , Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) , Brun, Fraisse, and Thesmar (2013) , Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wiedalek (2014), or Jiménez et al. (2014b) ), our paper examines how an inherent feature of the regulation itself leads to changes in capital requirements and corresponding adjustments in lending. This difference is important, since regulators have certain objectives when they adjust capital charges, while the adjustments in our setup are driven by an exogenous credit risk shock. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically quantify how changes in model-based capital charges affect the supply of loans to firms. 4 Our paper also contributes to the literature on the real effects of the credit crunch that followed the recent financial crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) , Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011), Kahle and Stulz (2013) , Iyer et al. (2014) , Paravisini et al. (2014) ). We show that the pro-cyclical design of capital regulation was an important factor contributing to the credit crunch in Germany. As our findings are even larger at the firm-level, they illustrate that changes in capital charges can have sizeable real effects and point to potential conflicts between micro-prudential regulation and macro-prudential policy objectives. The model-based approach gives banks an extra incentive to cut back lending when credit conditions deteriorate, which might enhance the safety of the individual bank and could have a payoff in terms of the long-term solvency of the banking system (Repullo and Suarez (2012) ). However, when all banks simultaneously restrain their lending, firms' access to funds becomes restricted, which is undesirable from a macro-prudential point of view. In this context, our findings can be seen as a motivation for introducing macro-prudential tools such as the counter-cyclical capital buffer. 5 Finally, our paper adds to the literature on the costs and benefits of model-based regulation. One of the main objectives of this regulatory approach was to strengthen the soundness and stability of the financial system by establishing a closer link between capital charges and actual asset risk, and by promoting the adoption of stronger risk management practices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006)). However, the regulation has been criticized for being overly complex, for ignoring the endogenous nature of risk, and for providing banks with incentives and opportunities 4 Earlier studies have used simulation models (Kashyap and Stein (2004) , Francis and Osborne (2009)) or analyzed the effects of business cycles on aggregate buffers (Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina (2004), Lindquist (2004) ). The impact of bank liquidity or capital shocks on loan supply has been examined by Bernanke (1983) , Bernanke, Lown, and Friedman (1991) , or Kashyap and Stein (2000) .
5 See Galati and Moessner (2013) for a survey of the literature on macro-prudential regulation. Recent contributions include Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008 ), Brunnermeier et al. (2009 ), Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011 ), and Acharya et al. (2012 .
to misreport risks (Daníelsson et al. (2001 ), Hellwig (2010 , Haldane (2012) , Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) , Admati and Hellwig (2014) ). In a recent paper, Behn, Haselmann, and Vig (2015) document that internal risk estimates employed for regulatory purposes systematically underpredict actual default rates. Despite all these reservations about the calculation of risk-based capital charges, our paper demonstrates that PDs increase in economic downturns and banks respond by reducing loan balances. 6 Section I describes the institutional details regarding the introduction of Basel II in Germany and our data. Section II outlines our empirical strategy. Loan level results are covered in Section III and firm level results in Section IV. Robustness tests are summarized in Section V and Section VI offers our conclusions.
I. Institutional background and data

A. Introduction of risk-weighted capital charges
The original Basel agreement (Basel I) assigned each bank asset to one of several risk buckets that received different risk weights (e.g., all corporate loans had the same risk weight of 100 %) and set required capital as a fraction of risk-weighted assets. A drawback of this framework was that banks had an incentive to hold the riskiest assets within each risk bucket, as these provided the highest yield, while being subject to the same capital charges as less risky assets in the bucket.
Therefore, an important motive for the introduction of Basel II capital standards was the desire to establish a stronger link between capital charges and the actual risk of each asset.
Under Basel II, banks are allowed to choose between two broad methodologies to calculate their capital charges for credit risk. 7 First, the standard approach (SA) is similar to the old Basel I framework and automatically assigns a fixed risk weight of 100 % to the uncollateralized part of 6 Importantly, our interest is in the way PDs change in response to an exogenous credit risk shock and not in the level of PD estimates relative to actual default rates. Identification in our paper relies on the observation that the average PD increases in response to an exogenous credit risk shock.
7 For the Basel agreements, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988, 2006) . Basel III maintains main features of Basel II, most notably the IRB approach, but introduces additional tools to address shortcomings.
corporate loans if the borrower has no external rating. 8 Second, banks can opt for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach that relies on the banks' own estimates of the risk associated with a loan. Under IRB, the risk weight for a loan is based on estimates of four parameters: the probability of default (PD), the loss given default, exposure at default, and the effective maturity of the loan.
The higher the estimate for any of these parameters, the higher the risk weight attributed to the loan. 9 For our analysis, the crucial issue is that capital charges are endogenous to credit risk with IRB but not with SA. The internal risk models used by German banks estimate PDs continuously, so PDs are likely to increase during an economic downturn, implying higher capital charges if the bank is using IRB. In contrast, capital charges for loans under SA are determined when the loan is made and do not change.
Since the introduction of the IRB approach involves substantial administrative costs, it was only adopted by the larger banks that could benefit from scale economies. These banks have an incentive to become IRB institutions, because capital requirements are substantially lower under IRB than under SA. In order to deal with the operational complexity of introducing new rating models, banks that opted for IRB did not apply the new approach to all loans at once; rather, they agreed on a gradual implementation plan with the regulator. The implementation plan specifies an order according to which IRB is applied to the bank's loan portfolios (which are generally loans to a specific business unit). As the calibration of a meaningful PD model requires sufficient data on past loan performance, banks typically started with loan portfolios in business units where they were relatively active (see Section II.B).
The introduction of IRB is closely monitored by the regulator. Each model has to be approved prior to its introduction and models are validated at least once a year. Once a rating model has been put in place for a specific portfolio, it is used to determine the capital charges for all new and existing loans. Thus, all loans in a portfolio are irrevocably shifted at the same time, so that it is not possible for the bank to strategically shift individual loans from one approach to the 8 If a firm's debt is rated by an external agency, the rating can be used to determine capital charges for loans. In Germany, very few firms have external corporate bond ratings (0.1 % of the firms in our data have external ratings). We exclude loans to these firms from our analysis. In unreported regressions we find that our main result is less pronounced in this subsample, maybe because external ratings also change over the business cycle (although they tend to be more sticky than internal ratings, see Borio and Zhu (2012) ).
9 In the advanced internal ratings-based approach, the bank provides estimates for all four parameters, while in the basic internal ratings-based approach the bank estimates only the PD, and standard values are assumed for the other parameters. We do not distinguish between the advanced and basic internal ratings-based approaches in our empirical analysis, because the risk weight depends on the loan's PD in both cases.
other. This also implies that all of a bank's loans to a given firm are classified under the same regulatory approach at any point in time. The German banks that adopted IRB submitted their implementation plans to the regulator in 2006. Hence, they were not able to react to the financial crisis by changing the order of loan portfolios that were transferred to IRB or by applying the standard approach to IRB portfolios after loan PDs deteriorated. At the outset of our data period, 2008Q1, the IRB phase-in of portfolios was underway. Thus, capital charges for IRB banks were determined by the IRB approach for some loan portfolios and by the SA for others. This set-up allows us to investigate the impact of capital regulation on loan supply, since (1) there is time variation in capital charges for IRB but not for SA portfolios, and (2) there are SA and IRB loans within the same bank. In the next section, we show that the Lehman collapse can be considered as an exogenous shock to the capital charges for IRB loans in Germany.
B. The Lehman event as an exogenous shock to credit risk
As explained in the introduction, it is difficult to examine the relationship between changes in the PD and changes in lending, as these variables are endogenous. To get around this issue, we exploit an exogenous increase in banks' expectations about credit risk which occurred after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. That is, we examine the impact of this credit risk shock on lending behavior. Here we present several sources of data in support of our claim that the post-Lehman economic downturn was accompanied by an exogenous shock to credit risk. To summarize, the Lehman collapse is a valuable tool for our identification strategy, because it differs from the onset of a typical recession; it was large and unanticipated. Changed expectations regarding future economic performance led to an exogenous increase in estimated probabilities of default, thus inducing variation in changes in capital charges between loans that were subject to IRB and loans that were subject to SA.
C. The decline in aggregate lending following Lehman
The impact of the credit risk shock on aggregate bank lending in Germany is shown in Figure 1 Behn, Haselmann, and Vig (2015) ). Only after the third quarter of 2008 (our event date) did lending begin to decline.
The relationship between the decline in aggregate lending and increases in model-based capital charges is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2 . It shows aggregate IRB loans reported in the German credit register and the associated risk-weighted assets (RWAs). The left-hand graph shows that the aggregate volume of IRB loans drops sharply after the shock and the right-hand graph shows the ratio of total RWAs to total IRB loans, which increases sharply until the second quarter of 2009, then declines for about a year and levels off.
[ Figure 2 here] The figure shows that banks had to hold more capital for the same amount of IRB loans following the credit risk shock. This pattern illustrates the pro-cyclical effect of capital charges: during a recession, banks reduce lending in order to keep capital charges constant. The decline in the ratio of RWAs to loans occurred because banks reduced those loans whose risk weights increased most after the shock. We provide evidence for this interpretation in Panel B of Figure 2 , which shows total RWAs under the assumption that banks do not adjust the quantity of their loans. Specifically, we calculate a hypothetical series for RWAs by multiplying the observed risk weight for each loan in each period by the loan amount in 2008Q3, and then aggregate these amounts in each quarter. 12
The right graph of Panel B depicts the ratio of the hypothetical RWAs series to the total amount of loans in 2008Q3. It shows that if banks had not adjusted their IRB loans following the credit risk shock, the RWAs to loans ratio would have continued to increase throughout the period. Figure 2 offers strong evidence of a pro-cyclical effect of risk-weighted capital charges on bank loan supply.
D. Data and descriptive statistics
Our principal source of data is the German credit register compiled by Deutsche Bundesbank.
The central bank collects data each quarter on all outstanding loans of at least e 1.5 million.
A unique feature of the Bundesbank credit register is that banks have to report the regulatory approach used to determine capital charges for the loan as well as the corresponding credit risk estimates (i.e., PDs). The dataset also includes information on the lender's and the borrower's identity, the amount of the loan outstanding, risk-weighted assets corresponding to the loan, and the amount of collateral provided by the borrower. We supplement the loan data with annual information on the lenders from bank balance sheets obtained from the Bundesbank's BAKIS database.
Our sample includes 1,825 banks. We restrict the analysis to those commercial loans for which we are able to determine the regulatory approach used at the beginning of our sample period in 2008. 13 We consider a loan to be an IRB loan if the bank adopted the approach for the loan no later than the second quarter of 2008. Since the implementation of the internal ratings-based approach extends over several years, some loans that we classify as SA are moved to IRB during our sample period. We take a closer look at these loans in Section V.
As shown in Panel A of Table I , there are 1,784 banks using SA and 41 banks that have adopted IRB. On average, IRB banks had adopted the new approach for 62 % of their loans at the start of our sample period (Share IRB ). The IRB banks are much larger, have lower equity ratios and about the same ROA as institutions using the SA.
[ Table I IRB banks report PDs for all loans and they are on average lower for loans under IRB. Furthermore, in line with our expectations, risk-weighted assets for IRB loans are considerably lower than risk-weighted assets for the other types of loans. PDs for IRB loans increased by more than one third over the shock, which is associated with a rise in risk-weighted assets of about 6.7 % for IRB loans. As regulatory capital requirements are 8 % of risk-weighted assets, this means that capital charges for loans under IRB increased by 0.54 percentage points on average (6.7 % × 8 %).
In contrast, risk-weighted assets for SA loans are not affected by changes in PDs (see Table I ,
Panel B).
Since the German credit register does not contain information on interest rates, we follow a procedure developed by Haselmann, Schoenherr, and Vig (2015) to infer interest rates from the data that are available. Specifically, we infer the repayment structure of the loan contract from the quarterly data on loan amounts. We match this information with firm-level data on aggregate interest payments obtained from the Bundesbank's USTAN database. This procedure allows us to back out effective annual interest rates on individual loans. Interest rates for loans under the standard approach are on average slightly lower than interest rates for loans under IRB, while there seems to be no difference in the adjustment of interest rates over the shock. In contrast, we observe considerable differences in the adjustment of loan quantities: the average IRB loan is reduced by 7.5 % over the shock, which is almost double the amount of the reduction for the average SA loan provided by IRB banks, and about six times the reduction of the average loan provided by SA banks.
Panel B also reports variables measured at the portfolio level, that is, averages for variables that describe the loans in a bank's portfolio. Portfolio share for a loan to a firm is the ratio between the bank's loans in the two-digit SIC code industry sector and all loans in our sample within that sector. Portfolio PD is the average firm-specific PD for the bank's loans in that industry sector.
Finally, we match our loan data with accounting information for German firms from Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database. The Bundesbank credit register and the Amadeus accounting infor-mation were hand-matched by company name and location. Matches were made for 7,778 firms.
Firms in the matched sample are rather large, with average assets of e 153.4 million (see Panel C, Table I ). The average total loans to the firms in our matched sample equalled e 22.7 million prior to the event, and declined by 7.8 % on average following the event. Remarkably, the percentage decline in total loans to these firms is larger than the decline in the average loan within our sample.
We will further examine this in Section IV.
II. Empirical Strategy
A. Loan-level lending
We develop three tests to show how banks adjust their loans in response to the credit risk shock.
We start by examining how banks that adopted the IRB approach (IRB banks) adjust their loans relative to banks still using the standard approach (SA banks) around the shock. We refer to this as Test 1 and estimate the following specification:
The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of loans from bank j to firm i around the credit risk shock. We collapse the quarterly data into pre-and post-event averages (as defined in Section I.D) in order to avoid problems of serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) ). 14 Thus, there is one observation per firm-bank relationship. Share IRB j is the percentage share of all loans by the bank that are subject to the IRB approach. Control variables are denoted by X ij . Standard errors are double-clustered at the bank and firm level in all our regressions.
Following Khwaja and Mian (2008), we capture differences in firm demand by including firm fixed effects, α i , which also account for the possibility that firm demand was already affected prior to the credit risk shock. Thus, our coefficient β indicates whether the same firm, borrowing from (at least) two different banks, experiences a larger decline in lending from banks that use IRB for a larger share of their loans. If, however, the credit risk shock (or other confounding events) affected banks that differ in their share of IRB loans in a systematically different way, and the variables X ij are unable to control for these differences, the correlation between Share IRB j and the error term, ij , might be non-zero. In this case, β would be biased.
To address this concern, we develop tests that exploit the gradual introduction of model-based regulation in Germany. Importantly, at the time of the credit risk shock, banks that had introduced IRB had shifted only some of their loan portfolios to the new approach. Thus, there is variation in the regulatory approach within the same bank, which allows us to refine the identification strategy.
To start, we test whether the results from Test 1 are due to bank heterogeneity. That is, we examine whether-for the same firm-SA loans from banks that have begun to introduce IRB and loans from SA institutions are affected differently by the shock (Test 2). Neither the SA institution's capital charges nor those for an IRB bank's SA loans are affected by an increase in the credit risk of the borrowing firm. If differences in lending behavior are due to the regulatory approach rather than bank differences, then Test 2 should not show any effects. 15
Our strongest identification strategy compares IRB and SA loans to the same firm, from different banks that have introduced the IRB approach for some of their loan portfolios (Test 3). To identify the effect of differences in capital regulation on loan amounts within IRB institutions, we restrict the sample to firms that borrow from at least two IRB banks-one bank where the loan is in the IRB pool and another where the loan is still subject to SA-and estimate the following equation:
where p denotes the loan pool and IRB loan pj takes the value of one if the respective loan is in the IRB pool and zero if the loan is in the SA pool of bank j. Test 3 shows whether the same firm-borrowing from two different IRB banks-experiences a larger decline in its loans which are under IRB as compared with those under SA. In contrast to Equation (1), this specification allows us to include bank fixed effects, α j , that systematically control for bank-specific loan supply shocks and other sources of heterogeneity across banks (see e.g. Jiménez et al. (2014a) ).
15 If our findings in Test 1 are driven by bank heterogeneity, we expect similar effects with this sample of SA loans.
B. Selection of IRB portfolios
While we are able to systematically control for firm and bank heterogeneity in Equation (2), one could still be concerned about differences between IRB and SA loans (e.g., with respect to credit risk or contract terms). Such differences would introduce selection bias if they were related to the adjustment of loans over the credit risk shock. As noted in Section I.A, banks had to irrevocably switch whole portfolios of loans to IRB, rather than individual loans, and the order in which they would switch portfolios was determined in 2006, well before the crisis began. To further scrutinize this matter, we examine which factors explain the selection of IRB loans and propose an additional test that allows us to systematically control for any potential differences between IRB and SA loan pools.
We regress IRB loan pj , which indicates whether a loan was shifted to IRB prior to the credit risk shock on loan and portfolio characteristics. There are two portfolio characteristics that may impact the IRB selection: (1) since the regulator only approved risk models for portfolios that had sufficient data for calibration, the size of a loan portfolio, Portfolio share, should be positively correlated with IRB loan pj ; (2) banks have an incentive to shift those loan portfolios that carry the smallest risk (measured by Portfolio PD) first, since for these portfolios the shift to IRB would provide the greatest reduction in capital charges. Results in Table II show that only the size of the portfolio is related to the selection of IRB portfolios prior to the credit risk shock, while all other loan characteristics such as the size of the loan, the collateral ratio, the indicator for relationship lending and the relationship length do not have a significant impact. Although the Portfolio PD is on average lower for loans under IRB, the coefficient is insignificant in the selection equation.
The results hold in the sample of all loans from IRB banks (columns 1-3), and in the sample of loans to firms with at least one IRB loan and at least one SA loan from an IRB bank that we use for identification in Test 3 (columns 4-6). Consequently, we keep Portfolio share as a control for selection in our tests.
[ Table II here]
To mitigate remaining concerns regarding differences between IRB and SA loans, we exploit cross-sectional variation within the IRB portfolios to develop an additional test that relies solely on variation within the pool of loans subject to IRB. The risk weight formula relating PDs to risk-weighted assets includes capital charge discounts that were designed to promote lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As illustrated in Figure 3 , risk weights vary with firm sales when sales are less than e 50 million, which means that an identical increase in the PD induces a smaller increase in the risk weight for loans to SMEs. Consequently, capital charges for IRB loans to these firms are less affected by the credit risk shock. By testing whether the effect estimated in Equation (2) is less pronounced for SMEs, we can identify the effect of changes in capital charges on lending within the IRB loan pool. Specifically, we can include bank × loan pool fixed effects (i.e., fixed effects for the SA and IRB pool of each bank) and estimate the following equation:
where the variable Log(firm sales) i is equal to the logarithm of sales for firms with a turnover lower than the threshold, and equal to the logarithm of 50 million for larger firms. Bank × loan pool fixed effects are denoted by α pj and account for any potential difference between the IRB and SA pool of bank j. The coefficient of interest, ζ, indicates whether the relative adjustment of IRB loans is less severe for loans to SMEs that benefit from the discount in capital charges. In similar specifications, also including bank × loan pool fixed effects, we investigate whether the IRB effect is more pronounced for loans to which the bank has a large exposure, or for loans to less profitable firms for which the PD is more likely to increase.
[ Figure 3 here]
C. Firm-level borrowing
In Section II.A we developed tests to identify the effect of the credit risk shock on the adjustment of individual loans. We also explore the effect of changes in capital charges on the ability of firms to access funds. Firms may be able to offset the pro-cyclical effects on loans subject to IRB by obtaining funds from other banks. We examine whether the change in firms' total outstanding loans around the credit risk shock depends on IRB loan i , the share of the firms' loans that were under IRB prior to the shock:
The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of a firm's total bank loans over the credit risk shock. The vector X i includes firm controls and weighted averages of bank control variables. 16
Standard errors in the firm-level regressions are clustered by the firms' largest lender.
Firms that borrow mostly from SA banks may differ from firms that borrow mostly from IRB banks, most notably in their demand for loans. E.g., small firms are more likely to borrow from smaller banks which are largely SA institutions. As we cannot directly control for loan demand in the firm-level regression, we estimate Equation (4) on a restricted sample of firms that have both SA loans and IRB loans from IRB banks. In this case the explanatory variable is IRB loan i * , which is the share of a firm's loans from IRB banks that are subject to the IRB approach. That is, we focus on firms that borrow mostly from IRB banks and check whether-among those firms that have multiple loans from IRB banks-firms with a larger share of IRB loans experience a greater reduction in aggregate loans over the shock. 17
Additionally, we also report β coefficients from Equation (4) with an adjustment for potential credit demand shocks on the firm level as suggested by Jiménez et al. (2011) . The adjustment uses the difference between firm fixed effect and OLS estimates on the loan level to proxy for the unobserved covariance between credit supply and demand shocks on the firm level. Specifically, the adjusted coefficient is defined as follows:
where β OLS and σ 2 F are the firm-level OLS coefficient and the variance of IRB loan i * , while β OLS , β F E and σ 2 L are loan-level OLS and fixed effect coefficients and the variance of IRB loan pj .
16 We use the amount that the firm borrows from a certain bank divided by the firms' total loans prior to the shock as a weight.
17 Aggregate loans to these firms also include loans from SA banks that are not taken into account for the definition of IRB loani * . However, loans from IRB banks account for 85.4 % of total loans for the average firm in this sample.
The remaining loans from SA banks simply add noise and thus prevent us from finding a significant impact of the share of a firm's loans from IRB banks that are subject to IRB on changes in total firm loans.
III. Capital regulation and banks' adjustments in lending
A. Main results
We start by testing whether banks that adopted the IRB approach adjusted their loans differently in response to the credit risk shock compared to banks that continued to use the SA (Test 1).
Estimates for Equation (1) are reported in Table III , columns 1 to 3. Since observations of firms with a single lending relationship get absorbed by firm fixed effects, we restrict the sample to firms that have at least two loans-one loan from an SA bank and one loan from an IRB bank, or two loans from distinct IRB banks. 18 Column 1 indicates that the larger the share of IRB loans within a bank, the more the bank reduces its loans to a given firm. Firm-specific credit demand shocks are absorbed by the firm fixed effects. Adding control variables (bank size, capitalization and profitability, bank type indicators and Portfolio share) in column 2 reduces the magnitude, but not the significance of the coefficient. In column 3, we replace Share IRB with IRB bank, a dummy indicating whether the lender is an IRB institution, and still find a significant effect.
[ Table III here]
To illustrate the economic impact of the effect, we compare the change in loans made by an SA bank to the change in loans from the average IRB bank. For an SA bank, Share IRB is zero and the average value for an IRB bank is 0.62. Thus, the average IRB bank reduced its loans to the same firm by 5.0 % more than a bank still using SA (column 1). The difference in the change in loans is 3.3 % when bank controls are included, column 2. The coefficient on the dummy or indicator variable shown in column 3 implies that IRB banks reduced their loans by about 3.1 % more than SA banks on average. 19
Next, in columns 4-6 of 19 The effect is equal to exp(β) − 1, where β is the dummy coefficient (Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)). 20 There are 10,496 firms that have at least one SA loan from an SA bank and at least one SA loan from an IRB bank, or two SA loans from different IRB banks. These firms have a total of 49,492 SA loans; 35,852 are from SA banks and 13,640 are from IRB banks.
institutions, the effect disappears when we control for bank characteristics in column 5 and in column 6. Moreover, the coefficients are smaller than the corresponding coefficients for Test 1 in all cases. As before, firm fixed effects absorb any firm-specific credit demand shocks and ensure that we are comparing relative changes in loans to a given firm. The results so far support our claim that the regulatory approach itself induced a stronger reduction of loans from IRB banks or banks with more IRB loans.
We now turn to our strongest identification test, for which the sample is restricted to loans made by IRB banks. 21 Estimates of Equation (2) are reported in columns 7 to 9 of Table III. The key results are the significant negative coefficients on the IRB loan dummy which indicates whether the loan was transferred to IRB prior to the credit risk shock. The results in column 7 indicate that within the same firm, loans subject to IRB are reduced by about 3.8 % more than loans subject to SA. The effect is robust to the inclusion of bank-level control variables in column 8. Since IRB banks have SA and IRB loans, we can systematically account for bank heterogeneity by including bank fixed effects (column 9). We still find a significant effect of the regulatory approach on changes in loans to the same firm. This provides evidence that changes in capital charges for IRB loans have a strong and economically meaningful influence on the extent to which the loans were 'crunched' in response to the credit risk shock. Increases in risk weights during economic downturns force capital-constrained banks that use the internal ratings-based approach to deleverage in order to fulfill their capital requirements. Results for Test 3 indicate that they do so by reducing the very assets that caused the increase in capital requirements: loans that are subject to IRB. Loans that are subject to the standard approach, on the other hand, are relatively less affected. 22 To account for potential selection concerns resulting from the order in which loan portfolios were shifted to IRB, our estimates include the relative size of a loan portfolio (i.e., Portfolio share, the share of bank j's loans in firm i's two-digit SIC industry sector) as a control variable. The coefficient on Portfolio share is positive and-in most regressions-insignificant. Hence, if anything, banks tend to adjust loans less in response to the shock in portfolios where they are relatively active.
21 There are 7,159 firms with at least one IRB and one SA loan from two different IRB institutions. These firms have a total of 27,620 loans: 9,226 SA loans and 18,394 IRB loans.
22 The magnitude of these effects is in line with evidence on aggregate lending provided by Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wiedalek (2014). They find that an increase in capital requirements by 1 percentage point induces a fall in bank-level loan growth by 6.5 to 7.2 percentage points. Studies estimating the effect of higher bank capital ratios on loan growth usually find somewhat smaller effects (see Carlson, Shan, and Warusawitharana (2013) for an overview).
Thus, the selection of IRB loans would bias our estimates against finding a significant effect of the choice of the regulatory approach on changes in loans over the event. A further test that mitigates remaining concerns about selection exploits the capital charge discount for SMEs as shown below.
So far, we have focused on changes in the size or volume of lending relationships, which we call the intensive margin. We can also ask whether IRB banks are more likely to end an existing relationship entirely if the loan is subject to IRB as compared with SA: the extensive margin.
These tests are found in Table IV , where the dependent variable is a dummy variable, Exit, that equals one for loans that existed in the second quarter of 2008 but that ceased to exist at some point following the event. The equations follow the specifications for Test 3 in Equation (2). The coefficient for IRB loan is positive, but insignificant in most cases, indicating that the effect of the regulatory approach is less pronounced on the extensive as compared with the intensive margin of lending. 23 [Table IV here]
In addition to the volume of lending, changes in capital charges might also affect the price of lending (the interest rate charged on a loan). We explore this possibility by estimating Equation (2) for Test 3 with the change in interest rate instead of the change in loans as the dependent variable.
Results are summarized in Table V . The coefficient on the IRB loan dummy is positive, indicating that, relatively, interest rates increase more on IRB loans, but the effect is small and statistically insignificant (column 1). This result holds if we add bank specific control variables (column 2), bank fixed effects (column 3), and firm fixed effects (column 4). These findings suggest that banks react to the increase in capital charges on IRB loans by reducing loan quantities instead of increasing interest rates.
[ Table V here]
B. Risk weights and lending to small and medium enterprises
In this section, we exploit an institutional feature of the Basel regulation-the capital charge discount for loans to SMEs-to address remaining concerns regarding the selection of IRB loans at the outset of our sample period. The idea behind the test is quite simple: the slope of the mapping from PDs into risk weights is smaller for loans to SMEs than it is for loans to larger firms at any point along the mapping (see Figure 3) . Consequently, capital charges for IRB loans to SMEs are less affected by the credit risk shock. We examine whether the relative reduction of IRB loans compared with SA loans to the same firm is less pronounced for SMEs. In this way, we can identify the effect of changes in capital charges on lending within the IRB loan pool, thus addressing any concerns one could still have regarding the selection of loans into the IRB group.
[ Table VI here] As a starting point, we restrict ourselves to loans subject to the IRB approach for which we have information on the firm's sales, and check whether the lending adjustment in response to the credit risk shock is related to the sales of the firm (Table VI) . IRB loans to firms with lower sales are reduced less over the credit risk shock (column 1), while there is no relationship between firm sales and adjustments in lending for IRB banks' loans under SA (column 2). Furthermore, we find a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction between Log(firm sales) and the IRB loan dummy (column 3) that is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects (column 4) and bank × loan pool fixed effects (column 5). This means that IRB banks reduce IRB loans to the same firm relatively more than SA loans, but less so if the loan benefits from the capital charge discount for SMEs. Specifically, we can compare a firm with sales of e 25 million to a large firm with sales over e 50 million. The IRB effect is 1.3 to 3.2 percentage points larger in magnitude for loans to the larger firm which does not benefit from the capital charge discount (columns 3-5, bottom row).
Importantly, these effects are not driven by the selection of IRB loans, as bank × loan pool fixed effects in column 5 systematically control for any potential difference between the SA and IRB pool of a specific bank. Changes in capital charges exert a strong influence on the lending adjustment over the credit risk shock.
C. Impact of bank, loan, and firm characteristics Hellwig (2010) argues that banks reduced buffers over minimum capital requirements to a bare minimum in an attempt to 'economize on equity' prior to the crisis, and that there was only limited scope for raising additional equity during the crisis. Consequently, we expect that banks with initially lower capital ratios which are closer to the regulatory minimum will have a stronger reaction when capital requirements increase due to the credit risk shock. We test this by introducing an interaction between IRB loan and the bank's initial equity ratio in column 1, and an interaction with a dummy variable for banks with a higher than median pre-event equity ratio, High equity, in column 2 of Table VII . 24 The significantly positive coefficient for the interaction in column 1 shows that the IRB effect is mitigated as the bank's pre-event equity ratio increases. Similarly, the positive interaction coefficient in column 2 indicates that the effect of the regulatory approach is more pronounced for IRB loans from banks that had lower capital ratios prior to the event.
As shown at the bottom of the table, the magnitudes are large. For example, moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of Bank equity ratio, the stronger reduction of IRB loans is reduced by 3.1 percentage points (column 1).
[ Table VII here] Next, we investigate whether the size of a loan has an influence on how it is affected by the credit risk shock. Our concern is that increases in risk weights for larger loans result in larger increases in required capital, and hence banks may respond more. To test this, we calculate the bank's exposure to each loan by dividing the loan amount prior to the shock by the bank's pre-event total assets. Alternatively, we take the absolute size of the loan instead of the relative exposure of the bank as a criterion. We then generate two dummy variables; the first, High exposure, takes the value one if the exposure of the bank to a certain loan is larger than the median exposure in our sample, and the second, Large loan, takes the value one if the loan is larger than the median loan in our sample.
In contrast to the bank equity measures, these variables are on the loan level, which is why we can include bank × loan pool fixed effects in these tests. We show the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table VII. The coefficients for the interaction terms are significantly negative, indicating that the IRB effect is particularly pronounced for large exposures, that is, for loans for which increases in risk estimates translate into relatively large increases in capital requirements. The effects are large; for example, the coefficient in column 3 implies that the IRB effect is 14.1 percentage points greater for loans to which the bank has a higher than median exposure. This indicates the magnitude of potential real effects of increases in model-based capital charges. As the IRB effect is particularly pronounced for large loan exposures, effects on the aggregate firm level could be even larger than those on the loan level. We examine this issue in the next section.
Finally, our tests in Section III.A assumed that the shock uniformly increased PDs for IRB loans. However, a recession hits firms heterogeneously, and capital requirements increase the most for loans to firms whose PD increases the most. As explained before, relating the observed changes in the PD to changes in lending is problematic, as the risk assessment and the lending decision of a bank are endogenous. Therefore we use a firm's pre-shock profitability, measured by its ROA in 2007-08, since it is not directly affected by the banks' lending decision, but is likely to be observed and employed by the bank's analysts in order to predict future changes in the PD. Data on firm ROA is available for 3,370 firms that have both SA and IRB loans. We interact the IRB loan dummy with the Firm ROA or a dummy for firms with above median ROA, High ROA, and present regression results in column 5 and 6 of Table VII. 25 As expected, the interaction terms are positive in both instances, although only the coefficient in column 5 is statistically significant.
These findings are consistent with our main argument: IRB loans are reduced more than SA loans to the same firm, especially if the firm has a lower ROA prior to the credit risk shock and is hence more likely to experience an increase in the PD that would affect capital charges.
IV. Capital regulation and firms' overall access to funds
In this section we turn our attention to firms' overall access to funds. Specifically, we examine whether the pro-cyclical effects on individual loan balances documented above persist at the firm level. That is, are firms able to offset a reduction in loans from one bank by increasing their borrowing from another bank? Did firms relying on IRB loans experience a stronger reduction in aggregate loan supply? These questions are central for evaluating the real sector effects of increases in model-based capital charges. Table VIII , where the event is defined as before and the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of total bank loans to the firm. We start by estimating Equation (4), to determine the effect of the share of a firm's loans that are subject to IRB on the change in the firm's total outstanding loans using all 107,025 firms in our data (column 1 of Table VIII) . 26 Firms with a larger share of loans subject to IRB prior to the event experienced larger reductions in total borrowing. The coefficient remains highly significant and even increases in magnitude if we include variables that control for the average characteristics of a firm's lenders in column 2, and firm-level control variables in the matched sample of 7,778 firms in columns 3 and 4.
Firm-level results are shown in
The coefficient on IRB loan i in column 2 implies that a firm that had only IRB loans experienced a reduction in total loans that is 5.6 % larger than the decline in loans for a firm that had only SA loans. This effect increases to 11.3 % in the matched sample where we control for firm level characteristics (column 4). Interestingly, these aggregate firm effects are large compared to those previously shown at the loan level. After a credit risk shock, firms seem to be unable to compensate for the reduction in IRB loans by switching to SA loans. Furthermore, the stronger reduction of IRB loans documented at the loan level is particularly pronounced for large loan exposures (see Section III.C). It is likely that the combination of these two effects is responsible for the sizable effect of increases in model-based capital charges on firms' overall access to funds.
[ Table VIII here]
To address potential differences in loan demand by firms that borrow from SA and IRB institutions, we restrict the sample to firms that have both SA and IRB loans from IRB banks, that is, to the 7,159 firms we use for identification in Test 3. Although the sample is much smaller, there continues to be a significant impact of the share of a firm's loans from IRB banks that are subject to IRB (IRB loan i * ) on changes in firms' aggregate borrowing (Table VIII , column 5). Again, the result is robust to the inclusion of weighted bank-level characteristics as well as firm-level characteristics (columns 6 to 8). The effect is economically meaningful: the firm at the 75 th percentile of IRB loan i * (which had 81.7 % IRB loans) experienced a 3.0 to 4.6 % larger reduction in aggregate loans than the firm at the 25 th percentile (which had 42.6 % IRB loans).
Finally, we apply the Jiménez et al. (2011) procedure described in Section II.C to adjust the IRB effects for firm demand. The adjusted coefficients are shown at the bottom of the table. The corrections are relatively small in columns 1-4; in columns 5-8 they reduce the effects by about one third. The corrections indicate that it is unlikely that our findings are driven by heterogeneity in firms' demand for credit. Overall, the results in Table VIII provide strong evidence for a significant effect of the regulatory classification of loans within IRB banks on aggregate firm borrowing following the credit risk shock.
We also examine whether a firm's share of IRB loans affected its aggregate borrowing costs, measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total borrowing from the balance sheet and income statement. Regression results are summarized in Table IX . In line with the loan-level results in Section III.A, we find little evidence that firms that have more loans subject to the IRB approach experience significantly greater increases in capital costs over the credit risk shock (only the coefficient in column 1 is significant). This suggests that banks reacted to the credit risk shock by adjusting the amounts of IRB loans outstanding in order to deleverage and fulfill regulatory requirements rather than increasing the cost of loans.
[ Table IX here]
V. Robustness and further results
A. Confounding shocks and selection issues
The focus of our analysis is the differential adjustment of loans under different regulatory approaches in response to the credit risk shock. This shock was preceded by two related events:
the introduction of the Basel II approach at the beginning of 2007, a policy shock, and the banking crisis associated with problems in several 'Landesbanks' and commercial banks. Note that the policy shock and the credit risk shock work in opposite directions: Basel II reduced capital charges for IRB loans and should therefore, ceteris paribus, increase lending on these loans. The credit risk shock increased PDs and risk weights, which increases capital charges and should reduce lending.
As a consequence, any lingering effect of the policy shock in our event study should work against our findings. Moreover, our main identification test includes bank fixed effects and thus accounts for bank heterogeneity around the event, including problems in certain banks, in a systematic manner.
Nevertheless, we conduct several robustness tests to show that our results reflect responses to the credit risk shock and the associated increase in capital charges rather than delayed responses to earlier events. Detailed descriptions for these tests as well as the corresponding regression results are available in the Internet Appendix, Section B. First, we conduct placebo tests and find no significant differences in the adjustment of the different types of loans prior to the credit risk shock Our results are unaffected. Third, our testing framework acknowledges that each bank-firm relationship was subject to either SA or IRB regulation at the time of the credit risk shock. Due to the gradual phase-in of Basel II, several loans were moved from SA to IRB throughout our sample period. Excluding these loans from the sample does not affect the results.
B. Addressing the e 1.5 million reporting threshold
The German credit register contains a e 1.5 million reporting threshold that could potentially bias our estimates at the firm level. In particular, it could be that we find a stronger effect at the firm level because we are missing out smaller loans that are likely to be SA loans. We conduct several tests to show that the threshold is not a serious concern. Detailed descriptions for these tests as well as the corresponding regressions outputs are available in the Internet Appendix Section C.
First, we use firm balance sheet data and take the change in loans on the balance sheet instead of the change in loans in the credit register as the dependent variable in the firm-level regression, thus ensuring that we do not miss out any loans. We also restrict the sample to firms with higher than median coverage of loans in the credit register, or larger than median firms which tend to have larger loans that are more likely to be covered in the credit register. In all cases, the coefficient for the IRB variable remains significantly negative. Second, regarding the independent variable IRB loan i , we use a procedure suggested by Ongena, Tümer-Alkan, and Westernhagen (2012) to account for the loans of a firm that are not recorded in the credit register. We first calculate a firm-specific remainder of loans that is not covered in the credit register and then assume that (a) all these loans are subject to SA, or (b) all these loans are subject to IRB. Re-estimating the firmlevel regressions using the resulting alternative IRB variables, we obtain similar results to those 26 seen in the main test.
C. Ordinary least square results
Our results in Section III.A only include firms with multiple lending relationships, as this is a necessary condition for the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Results from OLS estimations which include firms with a single bank relationship are qualitatively similar to the fixed effect results.
Coefficients decrease in magnitude when we include single-relationship firms, which suggests that the IRB effect is less pronounced for these firms (see Internet Appendix Section D for details).
VI. Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we develop identification strategies that enable us to estimate how a credit risk shock that increases PDs and hence model-based capital charges affects bank lending. We use the shock that accompanied the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as an event that increased credit risk in the German market for corporate loans. At that time, German banks which had adopted internal ratings-based regulation had some loan portfolios subject to IRB and some using the standard approach. Our main finding is that the counter-cyclicality of capital charges based on individual asset risk has a significant pro-cyclical effect on the lending behavior of banks as well as a considerable effect on firms' aggregate ability to borrow. For a given firm, loans by different IRB banks are reduced by 2.1 to 3.9 % more when internal ratings (IRB) instead of fixed risk weights (SA) are used to determine capital charges. The effect is even stronger on the aggregate firm level: firms that had only IRB loans prior to the event experienced a reduction in total loans that was about 5 to 10 % larger than the reduction for firms that had only SA loans.
Thus, micro-prudential model-based capital regulation has sizeable macroeconomic consequences.
Our findings have important policy implications for the design of bank capital regulation. The new Basel III framework includes measures that are meant to address the problem of pro-cyclicality.
Most importantly, Basel III introduces a counter-cyclical capital buffer that requires banks to build up additional capital reserves in times of excessive credit growth, which can be used to satisfy capital requirements when economic conditions deteriorate. Our findings could be interpreted as justification for such a measure. However, counter-cyclical capital buffers reduce pro-cyclicality 27 only if the supervisor has sufficient foresight about future economic conditions. Unexpected shocks to credit risk (e.g., shocks that originate abroad such as the one analyzed in this paper) cannot be anticipated and, therefore, regulators cannot always pre-empt such shocks by setting buffer rates accordingly. Furthermore, Basel III introduces capital conservation buffers. These are meant to address the problem of pro-cyclicality by reducing the pressure on banks to deleverage when economic conditions deteriorate. However, they do not solve the basic problem of pro-cyclical capital regulation, as their release has severe consequences for banks, and markets might not accept lower capital ratios when economic conditions deteriorate. One measure that would reduce the problem of pro-cyclicality is a simple leverage ratio; but, with a leverage ratio, the link between capital charges and actual asset risk would vanish. Making a final judgment on risk-based capital requirements requires further research on the costs and benefits of this regulatory approach. Figure 2. Aggregate risk-weighted assets and IRB loans. Panel A shows aggregate loans from the credit register and the corresponding risk-weighted assets. The series include only those lending relationships that existed prior to the credit risk shock; i.e., we do not include lending relationships that were originated after the event.
The left-hand graph shows loans and riskweighted assets for these loans, and the right-hand graph depicts the ratio of risk-weighted assets to loans. Panel B shows risk-weighted assets and loans assuming a constant portfolio of loans. We include all loans that exist throughout the entire sample period and calculate the risk weight for each loan at each point in time. We calculate hypothetical risk-weighted assets by multiplying the loan amount of 2008Q3 with the risk weight for the respective period. The aggregate of the hypothetical risk-weighted assets and the (constant) loan total are shown in the left graph. The right graph shows the ratio between the two series. 
Table II Determinants of loan classification
The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator for the regulatory approach used for the loan in 2008Q1. It is equal to 1 if the loan from bank j to firm i is subject to IRB and equal to 0 if the loan is subject to the standard approach. Log(loan size) is equal to the logarithm of average loan size for the bank-firm relationship throughout the sample period (2008Q1 to 2011Q3). The remaining variables are defined in Table I . The sample includes all loans from IRB banks in columns 1-3 and the loans to firms with multiple lending relationships used for identification in Test 3 in columns 4-6. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank and at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Dependent variable IRB loan All firms
Multiple lending relationships (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table III Lending and the regulatory approach
The table shows the relationship between the decline in loan size and the regulatory approach used by the bank. We take the credit risk shock in late 2008 as an event and collapse all quarterly data for a given loan into a single pre-and post-event period. Data are restricted to (a) loans that are larger than e 1.5 million (b) loans from commercial, state, or cooperative banks that are subject to the Basel II capital regulation (c) loans that have an observation in both the pre-and the post-shock period. The dependent variable is the difference in Log(loans) between the pre-and the post-event period. In columns 1 to 3 we use observations for firms that have at least one loan from an SA bank and one loan from an IRB bank or loans from at least two distinct IRB banks (Test 1). In columns 4 to 6 the sample is restricted to SA loans and includes only firms that have at least one SA loan from an SA bank and at least one SA loan from an IRB bank or SA loans from at least two distinct IRB banks (Test 2). Finally, columns 7 to 9 include only loans from IRB banks and only firms that have at least one SA loan and at least one IRB loan from an IRB bank (Test 3). The IRB impact at the bottom of the table in columns 1-2 and 4 gives the difference in percentage points in the reduction in lending between loans from the average IRB bank (for which Share IRB equals 0.62) and loans from an SA bank (for which Share IRB equals 0); the difference between loans from IRB banks and loans from SA banks in column 3; and the difference in percentage points between loans under IRB and loans under SA in columns 7-9. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank and at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Table IV Extensive margin
The table examines the adjustment of lending at the extensive margin. The dependent variable Exit is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a loan that existed in the second quarter of 2008 ceased to exist after the credit risk shock. All columns include only loans from IRB banks, and columns 3 and 4 include only firms that have at least one SA loan and at least one IRB loan from an IRB bank. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank and at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Dependent variable:
Exit (1)(2)
Table V Interest rates
The table examines how changes in interest rates over the credit risk shock depend on the regulatory approach used for a specific loan. The dependent variable is the difference in Interest rate for a specific loan between the pre-and the post-event period. Bank controls in column 2 are the same as in Table III . Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank and at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Table VI Lending to small and medium enterprises
The table shows the relationship between the decline in loan size, the regulatory approach used by the bank, and the size of the firm. The dependent variable is the difference in Log(loans) between the pre-and the post-event periods.
The variable Log(firm sales) is equal to the logarithm of total sales for firms with a turnover less than e 50 million and equal to the logarithm of 50 million for firms with a larger turnover; it accounts for the capital charge discount given to loans to SMEs. The Size impact at the bottom of the table gives the difference in percentage points in the relative reduction of IRB loans to firms with total sales of e 50 million and firms with total sales of e 25 million.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank and at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. These regressions examine the interaction between the IRB effect and bank, loan and firm characteristics. As before, the dependent variable is the difference in Log(loans) between the pre-and the post-event period. In columns 1 and 2 we interact IRB loan with the Bank equity ratio (column 1) or with High equity, a dummy that indicates whether the bank equity ratio is above the median (column 2). Bank control variables are the same as in previous tables. In column 3 we interact IRB loan with High exposure, a dummy that indicates whether a bank's exposure to a specific loan (defined as the loan amount divided by the bank's total assets prior to the shock) is larger than the median, and in column 4 with Large loan, a dummy that indicates whether a specific loan is larger than the median loan in our sample. Columns 5 and 6 use a matched sample of 14,336 loans to 3,370 firms for which we are able to obtain balance sheet information and that have at least one SA loan and one IRB loan. We interact IRB loan with the Firm ROA (column 5) or a dummy that indicates whether the firm's pre-shock ROA is higher than the median (column 6). The Differential impact at the bottom of the table gives the difference in percentage points in the relative reduction of IRB loans where the respective cross-sectional dummy is equal to 1 and IRB loans where it is equal to 0 (columns 2-4), or the difference between IRB loans where the respective cross-sectional variable is at its 75 th percentile and IRB loans
where it is at its 25 th percentile (columns 1 and 5). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank and at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Table IX Firm capital cost
The table examines how changes in a firm's capital cost over the event depend on the regulatory approach used for its loans. The dependent variable is the change in a firm's capital cost (defined as interest paid over total loans) between the pre-and the post-event period. The variable IRB loan gives the share of a firm's loans that are subject to IRB.
The variable IRB loan * gives the share of a firm's loans received from IRB banks that are subject to IRB. For tests that include this variable the sample is restricted to firms that have at least one IRB loan and at least one SA loan from an IRB bank: i.e., firms for which the variable IRB loan * takes values unequal to 0 or 1. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the main bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
